We show that in heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium models that feature only idiosyncratic income risk, the wealth distribution inherits the tail behavior of income shocks such as light-tailedness and the Pareto exponent. Consequently, in this class of models, (i) it is impossible to generate heavy-tailed wealth distributions from light-tailed income shocks, and (ii) if income has a Pareto tail, wealth has the same Pareto exponent.
Introduction
When studying wealth inequality, one empirical feature stands out as striking and persistent over time and space: the wealth distribution exhibits a power law tail. This fact was first discovered by Pareto (1896 Pareto ( , 1897 and has since been confirmed by many studies (see, e.g., ). A closely related observation is that the income distribution is also heavy-tailed, although its Pareto exponent is significantly larger, implying a ligher tail than wealth. 1 * We thank Dan Cao for a stimulating conversation.
† Email: john.stachurski@anu.edu.au. ‡ Email: atoda@ucsd.edu.
1 The Pareto exponent for wealth is about 1.5 (Pareto, 1897; Klass et al., 2006; Vermeulen, 2018) , versus 2-3 for income (Atkinson, 2003; Nirei and Souma, 2007; Toda, 2012) . Since the tail probability of a Pareto random variable satisfies P (X > x) ∼ x −α , where α > 0 is the Pareto exponent, a smaller value for α corresponds to higher tail probability, implying a heavier tail (more inequality).
where y t+1 is income and ρ is some positive constant strictly less than 1. This inequality implies that the income shocks die out in the long run, and hence the wealth distribution inherits the tail behavior of income shocks. To obtain (1.1), we use the results from Li and Stachurski (2014) , who show the validity of policy function iteration for solving income fluctuation problems. With the bound (1.1) in hand, we characterize the tail behavior of wealth using the properties of the moment generating function and applying several inequalities such as Markov, Hölder, and Minkowski.
Related literature
Our work provides a logical converse to the findings of the growing literature that relies on idiosyncratic investment risk (as opposed to idiosyncratic labor income risk) to explain the Pareto tail behavior in the wealth distribution. Such models typically use mathematical results on random growth processes as reviewed in Mitzenmacher (2004) , Gabaix (2009) , and . Although we do not dis-cuss this literature in detail since these "possibility results" are not directly related to our impossibility theorem, interested readers are referred to Nirei and Souma (2007) , Benhabib et al. (2011 Benhabib et al. ( , 2015 Benhabib et al. ( , 2016 , Toda (2014), Acemoglu and Cao (2015) , Toda and Walsh (2015) , Arkolakis (2016) , Gabaix et al. (2016) , Nirei and Aoki (2016) , Aoki and Nirei (2017) , and Cao and Luo (2017) , among others.
The closest paper to ours is . 2 Citing a variety of empirical and numerical work, they document that (i) the empirical wealth distribution has a thicker tail than income and (ii) Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models "tend to produce tail indices of wealth close to those of the distribution of labor earnings which has been fed into the model". To explain point (ii), use mathematical results from Roitershtein (2007) and Ghosh et al. (2010) to show that, when income has a Pareto tail and agents use a linear consumption rule, the Pareto exponent of wealth is either entirely determined by the distribution of returns on wealth or equal to the Pareto exponent of income. 3 They also conjecture that similar results obtain with rational agents under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Our main result includes this conjecture as a special case. More broadly, in a general equilibrium setting that accommodates CRRA preferences, we show that when idiosyncratic shocks to investment returns are excluded from the model, wealth must inherit the tail behavior of income-not just the Pareto exponent-whether it be light-or heavy-tailed.
Tail thickness via moment generating function
In this section we define several notions of tail thickness of random variables using the moment generating function. To this end, recall that, for a random variable X defined on some probability space (Ω, F, P ), the moment generating function of X is defined at s ∈ R by M X (s) = E[e sX ] ∈ (0, ∞]. We define light-and heavy-tailed random variables as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Tail thickness). We say that a random variable X has a light upper tail if M X (s) = E[e sX ] < ∞ for some s > 0. Otherwise we say that X has a heavy upper tail.
Remark. One can justify this definition as follows. A random variable X is commonly referred to as having a heavy (Pareto) upper tail if there exist constants A, α > 0 such that P (X > x) Ax −α for large enough x, where α is the Pareto exponent. Since for y 0 we have e y y n /n! for any n by considering the Taylor expansion, for any s, x > 0 by Markov's inequality we obtain
Taking n > α and letting x → ∞, we obtain E[e sX ] = ∞.
2 Disclosure: Toda was the discussant of this paper at the 2017 AEA meeting.
3 During his presentation at the AEA meeting, Alberto Bisin put it this way: "It cannot be a bit of this and a bit of that. It's either this or that."
The following lemma shows that the tail probability of a light-tailed random variable has an exponential upper bound.
Lemma 2.2. If X is a light-tailed random variable, then
Proof. This is immediate from Markov's inequality, since, for any x, we have
The moment generating function M X (s) is convex and M X (0) = 1, Therefore {s ∈ R | M X (s) < ∞} is an interval containing 0, so
is well-defined. Taking the logarithm of (2.1) for s ∈ (0, α), dividing by x > 0, letting x → ∞ and s ↑ α, it follows that lim sup
Using the argument in Widder (1941, pp. 42-43 , Theorem 2.4a), one can easily show that the inequality (2.3) is actually an equality, although this fact plays no role in the subsequent discussion. Motivated by (2.3), we call the number α in (2.2) the exponential decay rate of the random variable X. Next we categorize heavy-tailed random variables. Since the logarithm of a Pareto random variable is exponential, it is convenient to define the tail thickness based on the logarithm. Let X be a heavy-tailed random variable and X + = X1 X 0 be its positive part. The moment generating function of log X + is
which is a convex function that is finite at s = 0. 4 By the same argument as above,
is well-defined and we have the property lim sup
We call α the polynomial decay rate of the random variable X. So far we have defined the tail thickness of a single random variable X, but as we shall see below, it is convenient to define similar concepts for a class of random 4 By convention, we set 0 0 = 1. Therefore E[X variables. Let T be some nonempty set and (X t ) t∈T be a collection of random variables defined on a common probability space (Ω, F, P ). Then we say that (X t ) t∈T is uniformly light-tailed if there exists s > 0 such that
If (X t ) t∈T is uniformly light-tailed, then it immediately follows from Lemma 2.2 that
for all x. Therefore the tail probabilities of (X t ) t∈T can be uniformly bounded by an exponential function. By taking the supremum over such s > 0, we can define the exponential decay rate α of (X t ) t∈T . We can similarly define uniformly heavy-tailed random variables and their polynomial decay rate in the obvious way.
In the next section, we apply these concepts to the wealth distribution.
The Impossibility Theorem
In this section we show that the wealth distribution in Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models inherits the tail behavior of income shocks. Let u : R + → {−∞} ∪ R be a utility function satisfying u ′ > 0, u ′′ < 0, and u ′ (∞) = 0. Given initial wealth a 0 0, consider the income fluctuation problem
where β > 0 is the discount factor, R > 0 is the gross risk-free rate, y t := y(z t ) 0 is income in state z t ∈ Z, a t is financial wealth at the beginning of period t including current income, and b 0 is a borrowing limit. As in Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), we can and do set b = 0 without loss of generality, so a t 0 for all t.
Regarding the income process, we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The income process satisfies sup t E[y t ] < ∞.
Because our object of interest is the wealth distribution in general equilibrium models (in typically stationary environments), Assumption 1 is relatively weak. For instance, it is satisfied if the state {z t } follows a finite-state Markov chain and the distribution of income y(z t ) conditional on the state z t has a finite mean.
With general utility functions, Li and Stachurski (2014) show that if R > 1, βR < 1, and ∞ t=0 R −t E[y t | z 0 ] < ∞, then a unique solution to the income fluctuation problem exists, 5 which can be computed by policy function iteration. Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that some sufficient conditions for the validity of policy function iteration are satisfied. The following assumption suffices for our purpose.
Assumption 2. For any constant κ > 1, we have
where x, y range in the domain of u.
Assumption 2 is also relatively weak. To see this, suppose that x, y 0 and
κ. Since u ′ > 0 and κ > 1, we have u ′ (y) > u ′ (x). As u ′′ < 0, this implies 0 y < x, and hence y/x < 1. Condition (3.2) adds a degree of uniformity to this bound. Lemma A.2 in the appendix shows that if the relative risk aversion γ(x) = −xu ′′ (x)/u ′ (x) is non-increasing for large enough x, then Assumption 2 holds. Lemma A.3 shows that the widely used hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility satisfies Assumption 2, including constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
The following lemma shows that under the impatience condition βR < 1, agents uniformly consume more than what is implied by the permanent income hypothesis. Using Lemma 3.1, we can show that the wealth dynamics arising from the income fluctuation problem has the contraction property shown in (1.1). First, if R < 1, by the budget constraint (3.1b) we obtain a t+1 Ra t + y t+1 = ρa t + y t+1 , (3.4)
where ρ = R < 1. Hence (1.1) holds. Second, if 1 < R < 1/β, by the budget constraint and Lemma 3.1, we obtain
for ρ = R(1 − λ) + λ. Since R > 1 and λ > 1,
Once again, the bound in (1.1) holds.
We are now ready to state our main result, which establishes that the wealth distribution in Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models inherits the tail behavior of income shocks. The intuition for this result is as follows. Under the impatience condition βR < 1, by Lemma 3.1, agents uniformly consume more than what is implied by the permanent income hypothesis. Since agents draw down their assets, wealth behaves similarly to income. (Theorem A.1 and Proposition A.5 in the appendix make these ideas precise.) While the preceding argument assumes the impatience condition βR < 1, in general equilibrium models this condition is necessarily satisfied. If the utility function is HARA, then the condition R = 1 can be dropped.
Theorem 3.2 is valuable since it places few assumptions. The only important assumption is that an equilibrium exists, which gives us the impatience condition βR < 1 to apply Proposition A.5. This assumption is minimal, for it is vacuous to study the wealth distribution unless an equilibrium exists. Regarding the income shocks, persistence and/or stationarity are irrelevant.
Theorem 3.2 has two important implications on the wealth distribution. (i) It is impossible to generate heavy-tailed wealth distributions from light-tailed income shocks. (ii) If the income shock has a Pareto tail with exponent α, the wealth distribution can have a Pareto tail, but its tail exponent α ′ can never fall below that of income shocks. Noting that smaller tail exponent means heavier tail, it follows that the wealth distribution cannot have a heavier tail than income.
Below, we discuss several applications of Theorem 3.2.
Example 1. Aiyagari (1994) uses the CRRA utility and a finite-state Markov chain for income. Hence by Theorem 3.2, the wealth distribution is light-tailed. (In fact, it is bounded by applying the stronger claim in Theorem A.1.)
Example 2. In Quadrini (2000) , even though there is idiosyncratic investment risk (stochastic returns), agents are restricted to only three levels of investment {k 1 , k 2 , k 3 } (see p. 25). Therefore the only investment vehicle that allows for unbounded investment is the risk-free asset, and the budget constraint reduces to one with stochastic income only. Since utility is CRRA, the wealth distribution is light-tailed.
Example 3. In Castañeda et al. (2003) , the utility function is additively separable between consumption and leisure and the consumption part is CRRA. Since shocks follow a finite-state Markov chain, the wealth distribution is light-tailed.
Example 4. The budget constraint in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) is
where a is risk-free asset and k is capital (see their Equation (4) on p. 846). Here ν ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter, r is the net interest rate, δ ∈ (0, 1) is capital depreciation rate, and θ is a random variable for productivity that has bounded support. Although there is some restriction on k, by ignoring the constraint and maximizing, we can bound the right-hand side by (1 + r)a + Y − c, where Y is some random variable with bounded support. Since utility is CRRA, the wealth distribution is light-tailed.
A Proofs

A.1 Tail behavior of a process with certain contraction property
The following theorem shows that a stochastic process that has a certain contraction property inherits the tail behavior of the shocks. is uniformly light-tailed with exponential decay rate α ′ (1 − ρ)α.
If sup
is uniformly heavy-tailed with polynomial decay rate α, then {X t } ∞ t=1 has a polynomial decay rate α ′ α.
Proof. We first show that we may assume φ(x) = ρx without loss of generality. To this end, take ρ ′ ∈ (ρ, 1). By assumption, ρ = lim sup x→∞ φ(x)/x < 1, so we can choosex such that φ(x) ρ ′ x for x x. Since φ is bounded on bounded sets, we can choose
Since adding a constant M to Y t does not change its tail behavior (e.g., boundedness, exponential decay rate, polynomial decay rate), setting φ(x) = ρx in (A.1) costs no generality.
Iterating on (A.1) with φ(x) = ρx yields
Case 2:
is uniformly light-tailed. Let α > 0 be the exponential decay rate. By definition, for any s ∈ [0, α), we have
In general, for any random variables Z 1 , Z 2 and θ ∈ (0, 1), by Hölder's inequality we have
Multiplying both sides of (A.2) by 1 − ρ > 0, we get
where Y 0 ≡ (1 − ρ)X 0 , θ 0 = ρ t , and θ k = (1 − ρ)ρ t−k for k 1. Noting that θ k 0 for all k and t k=0 θ k = 1, multiplying (A.4) by s > 0, taking the exponential, taking the expectation, and applying Hölder's inequality, it follows that
where f (s) is as in (A.3). Redefining (1 − ρ)s as s and noting that 0 < ρ t < 1 and X 0 0, we obtain
By the definition of the exponential decay rate α > 0, the right-hand side is finite if
is uniformly light-tailed, and the exponential decay rate satisfies α ′ (1 − ρ)α.
is uniformly integrable and heavy-tailed. Since by assumption
Since the right-hand side does not depend on t and f (s) < ∞ for s = 1 and s < α by definition, it follows that the polynomial decay rate of {X t } ∞ t=1 satisfies α ′ α 1.
Remark. It could be the case that
is light-tailed. An obvious example is φ(x) ≡ 0 and X t ≡ 0, in which case the polynomial decay rate of X t is α ′ = ∞.
Remark. The lower bounds on the tail exponents in Theorem A.1 are sharp. To see this, suppose that ρ ∈ [0, 1), X 0 = 0, X t = ρX t−1 + Y t , and {Y t } ∞ t=1 is perfectly correlated, so Y t = Y 1 for all t. By iteration, we obtain
Hence if Y 1 is exponentially-distributed with decay rate α (i.e., Y 1 has density f (x) = αe −αx for x 0), then X is exponentially distributed with decay rate (1 − ρ)α. If Y 1 is Pareto-distributed with Pareto exponent α and minimum size 1 (i.e., Y 1 has density f (x) = αx −α−1 for x 1), then X is Pareto-distributed with Pareto exponent α and minimum size Proof. Fix some x. Since u ′′ < 0, the supremum of (3.2) is attained by y such that u ′ (y) = κu ′ (x). Let y = g(x) be this y. By the implicit function theorem we have
Since u ′ > 0 and u ′′ < 0, if u is eventually DRRA, then γ(y) γ(x) whenever 0 y x are large enough. Since u ′ (y) = κu ′ (x), u ′′ > 0, and u ′ (∞) = 0, as x → ∞ it must be y → ∞. Therefore (g(x)/x) ′ 0 for large enough x. Since by the remark after Assumption 2 we know that g(x)/x < 1, it follows that sup g(x)/x < 1.
where a > 0 and b 0 are constants. Then u(x) satisfies Assumption 2.
Proof. Let κ > 1, x, y 0, and
Since a > 0, b 0, and κ > 1, solving the inequality we obtain
Setting b = 0, the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility satisfies Assumption 2. 6
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.1
To prove Lemma 3.1, we use the fact that the optimal consumption rule in the original problem can be bounded below by that with zero income. Proof. Given a candidate policy function c(a, z), according to Li and Stachurski (2014) , the policy function (Coleman) operator Kc(a, z) is the unique value 0 < t a that solves the equation Li and Stachurski (2014) show that K is a monotone contraction. Therefore it suffices to show Kc 0 (a) c 0 (a), for if that is the case we obtain c 0 (a) K n c 0 (a) → c(a, z). − t) ). Noting that u ′ is strictly decreasing, it follows from (A.5) that
To show that Kc 0 (a) c 0 (a) for all a, suppose on the contrary that t = Kc 0 (a) < c 0 (a) for some a. Then for this a, we have R(a − t) > R(a − c 0 (a)), so noting that c 0 is increasing in a and u ′ is strictly decreasing, we obtain
where the last equality is due to the fact that c 0 (a) is the fixed point of the policy function operator with y(z) ≡ 0. Since u ′ is strictly decreasing, we get t c 0 (a), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By Lemma A.4, it suffices to show that (3.3) holds for c(a, z) = c 0 (a). For notational simplicity, let c(a) = c 0 (a). and all the proofs go through. 7 Note that this equation is slightly different from Equation (6) in Li and Stachurski (2014) due to the difference in timing conventions. In Li and Stachurski (2014) , a is savings (end-of-period asset holdings) and the budget constraint is c + a ′ = Ra + y. In our framework, a is beginning-of-period wealth and the budget constraint is a ′ = R(a − c) + y ′ .
Let K be the policy function operator (A.5) associated with the zero income model, so for a consumption policy c = c(a), the number t = (Kc)(a) solves
Consider the policy c(a) = (1 − 1/R)a, which corresponds to the permanent income hypothesis. If βRu ′ (c(R(a − t))) u ′ (a) for this t, then by (A.6) it must be u ′ (t) = βRu ′ ((R − 1)(a − t)) ⇐⇒ u ′ ((R − 1)(a − t)) u ′ (t) = 1 βR .
Since βR < 1, Assumption 2 yields ((R − 1)(a − t)/t 1 − ǫ, where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant depending only on βR. Solving for t yields (Kc)(a) = t R − 1 R − ǫ a = 1 1 − ǫ/R c(a) c(a).
If βRu ′ (c(R(a − t))) < u ′ (a), then by (A.6) it must be u ′ (t) = u ′ (a) and hence (Kc)(a) = t = a R − 1 R − ǫ a since ǫ < 1. Therefore we have (Kc)(a) 
A.4 Tail behavior of wealth under impatience
The following proposition shows that when the impatience condition βR < 1 is satisfied, the wealth inherits the tail behavior of income.
Proposition A.5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, βR < 1, and R = 1. Let {a t } be the wealth arising from the solution to the income fluctuation problem (3.1). Then the following statements are true:
1. If {y t } is uniformly light-tailed, then so is {a t }.
2. If {y t } is uniformly heavy-tailed with polynomial decay rate α, then {a t } has polynomial decay rate α ′ α.
If the utility function is HARA, then the condition R = 1 can be dropped.
Proof. By (3.4) and (3.5), if R < 1 or 1 < R < 1/β, then we obtain a t+1 ρa t + y t+1 for some ρ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore the claim follows from Theorem A.1. Finally, consider the special case where u is HARA. For simplicity, assume that u is CRRA, so u(c) = that the optimal consumption rule with zero income exists if and only if βR 1−γ < 1, which is given by c 0 (a) = (1 − β 1/γ R 1/γ−1 )a. Therefore if βR < 1, by the budget constraint and Lemma A.4, we obtain a t+1 R(a t − c 0 (a t ))+ y t+1 = (βR) 1/γ a t + y t+1 , so we can apply Theorem A.1 for ρ = (βR) 1/γ < 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) show that in an income fluctuation problem, consumption {c t } diverges to infinity if βR 1, which is impossible in a general equilibrium model. Therefore if an equilibrium exists, it must be βR < 1. The conclusion then follows from Proposition A.5.
